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Abstract 
Using Paul Ricoeur’s theory of narrative to consider Lofland and Stark’s classic ‘Becoming a 
World-Saver’, I address a fundamental conundrum in the sociology of conversion. If the 
conversion story is told in the new light of the new discourse –brought about by the 
conversion—how can the sociologist use it to explain the conversion and the factors that led 
to it?  We consider the extent to which the sociology of religion has conflated the necessary 
elements of narrative structure for the stages of conversion.  Taking into consideration more 
recent research, the paper makes a case for careful and comparative sociological study of 
conversion narratives—considered as narrative accounts. I argue that doing so further 
opens up avenues for research, particularly if we consider the audiences for whom the 
stories are told and the purposes the stories serve, and a ultimately constitutes a sound 
basis for considering the processes of conversion themselves. 
 







Sociology does not trade in the phenomenology of religious experience-- rather, our 
theories rely on accounts of religious experience.  The difference is important: an account 
has already given symbolic shape to the experience, such that it may be understood both by 
those who had the experience and by the sociologist who asks about it. Such accounts 
typically take the form of a story, or narrative (Yamane 2000). Here I contend that the 
structure of narrative has given shape of some of our basic theoretical work on the 
sociology of religious conversion; disentangling the event from its subsequent narration is 
anything but straightforward. 
While sociologists have often used the stories respondents tell as sources of data 
about religious experience, values, beliefs and practices, we have less frequently taken an 
interest in the stories themselves—as stories (Wuthnow 2011).  This needs more attention, 
given the ubiquity of stories and story-telling in human societies. Unfortunately, sociologists 
of religion have sometimes seemed tone deaf to the tenor of religious narratives 
encountered in the field, especially in the elicited accounts that individuals use to explain 
their beliefs, commitments, and actions.  
Conversion narratives, while typically providing the most basic data for sociological 
theories of conversion, also pose a fundamental conundrum, as Snow and Machalek’s 
observed in their work on the convert as a “social type.” One of their key findings from 
interviews with converts to Nichiren Shoshu, a Buddhist sect, is that conversion is marked by 
“biographical reconstruction.” They show that for the convert the  
past is not only shattered; the disjointed pieces are reassembled in accordance with 
the new universe of discourse and its grammar. Some aspects of the past are 
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jettisoned, others redefined, and some are put together in ways previously 
inconceivable (1983, 266).  
The convert, Snow and Machalek show, has entered a new understanding of the world and 
must reinterpret their life before conversion accordingly. Thus, the conversion story is told 
from the vantage point that is the product of the event that the sociologist hopes to use the 
story to explain. Most problematically, this typically includes the respondent’s description of 
the state from which they have been saved, which often becomes a sociologists’ variable, 
and used to explain the likelihood of conversion (Heirich 1977).  
While Snow and Machalek’s theory of the convert as a social type has been subject to 
criticism (Staples and Mauss 1987), subsequent studies of conversion have typically found 
their claims about biographical reconstruction theoretically cogent as well as useful for 
empirical research on converts to groups other than Nichiren Shoshu (Staples and Mauss 
1987; Jindra 2014; Stromberg 1993; Darwish 2018). While biographical reconstruction is 
more or less continuous through the life-course (Ricoeur 1992)—meaning that the problem 
addressed here is ubiquitous—religious conversion typically provides a more acute 
reconstruction, and therefore poses a greater challenge for the sociologist; it also makes 
religious conversion “good to think” with (Levi-Strauss 1962, 132).  
In order to provide firm theoretical foundations for thinking about the problem of 
conversion accounts, I bring Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative to bear on the sociological 
consideration of conversion narratives. I then use what we learn from Ricoeur about the 
emplotment of narrative to revisit Lofland and Stark’s classic, paradigm-inaugurating, theory 
of conversion in “Becoming a World-Saver” (1965). Looking at Lofland and Stark’s theory in 
the light cast by Ricoeur shows how the theory of conversion reflects the logic of narratives 
at least as much as it shows a silhouette of conversion processes.  It may be possible to look 
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through narratives to the mechanisms at work in the processes of conversion; to do so, 
however, we must be able to discern more clearly the shape of the narrative through which 
we look at those processes. Otherwise we are likely to find ourselves unable to distinguish 
the narrative foreground from the social processes in the background, or indeed, we risk 
mistaking the foreground and the background.  
  
PAUL RICOEUR AND THE THEORY OF NARRATIVE 
In this essay, I attend to Ricoeur’s magisterial three volume study, Time and Narrative 
(1984, 1985 and 1988), which is arguably the single most important philosophical analysis of 
either time or narrative (Dowling 2011), paying more limited attention to his subsequent 
work on narrative identity (Ricoeur 1992). With the exception of medical sociology, which 
has adopted narrative identity as part of its theoretical toolkit (Ezzy 1998), we sociologists 
have largely ignored Ricoeur’s thought—especially his work on narrative.  In fact the last 
major study of Ricoeur’s work by a sociological theorist preceded the bulk of his work on 
narrative (Thompson 1981). Likewise, the anthology of Ricoeur’s writings most likely to be 
consulted by social scientists, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (Ricoeur 1981) does 
not include Ricoeur’s subsequent work on narrative. It may be that sociologists are to some 
degree repaying the philosopher for his own pointed inattention to our own tribe’s writings. 
While Ricoeur does refer on occasion to Max Weber, even key French sociologists, including 
Emile Durkheim and Pierre Bourdieu, are pointedly absent throughout his oeuvre.   
The primary objective of Time and Narrative is to bridge a fundamental antinomy that 
has plagued the philosophy of time since antiquity. The first of two basic positions, 
stemming from Aristotle, treats time as an objective, natural phenomenon, marked for 
example by the movement of the sun and moon and planets. The other, which was 
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inaugurated by Augustine in Confessions, is what will subsequently develop into the 
phenomenology of time: Augustine understands time in terms of the subject’s experience of 
time passing.  Ricoeur argues that both approaches bring something essential to our 
understanding of time, even if the two positions contradict one another.  
Ricoeur argues that in order to maintain their accounts of time, subjective theories 
repeatedly sneak “objective” or “natural” elements (like death) into their discussions. 
Likewise, the objective accounts of time smuggle in subjective notions to prop up their 
objective accounts of time; they lean on notions like before and after, the very perceptions 
on which the phenomenology of time depends. Narrative, however, bridges the objective 
and the subjective, understandings of time. All cultures and societies tell stories, and it is 
narrative that makes possible what Ricoeur calls “human time”.  Human time (which the 
sociologist can justifiably call “social time”) is not held hostage by the aporia at the heart of 
traditional philosophies of time. Narrative connects subjective time to events in the world, 
and gives meaning to objective time; it thus mediates between these two positions and the 
experience of time that each represents.  
A narrative is first and foremost a form of discourse with a plot that moves from 
beginning, through the middle, and to an end.  Events are arranged into a sequence 
(“emplotted”): “in accord with the irreversible order of time common to physical and 
human events” (67). The sequence of events, and development of characters, must be both 
meaningful and intelligible (65), and imply a causal sequence of “one thing because of 
another” when stitched together in a narrative (Dowling 2011, 5). Events which do not 
figure in the development of the plot, or show the development of the characters, need to 
be pushed to the background, or else refigured so that they contribute to an arc running 
from beginning to end.  Each event must be preceded by the events that caused them, and 
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followed by events to which they contribute.  Relationships between events, and their 
effects on characters that act and suffer the actions of others, must be “probable” (to use 
Aristotle’s terms), or in less technical terms, they must be plausible and cohere with our 
understanding of how the world works.   
Ricoeur follows Aristotle’s understanding of tragic narrative (the model for all 
narratives in Ricoeur’s theory) as “discordant concordance”.  Discordance, such as 
meaningless and unmerited suffering, brings chaos and anomie; these are made 
“concordant” as they are integrated into the arc of the plot and resolved, or at least given 
meaning by finding their place in the narrative.  In this context, Ricoeur draws our attention 
to two terms of analysis which appear in Aristotle’s discussion of complex tragedies, such as 
Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex: peripeteia and anagnorisis. In Aristotle’s Poetics, peripeteia, 
(“strokes of fate, terrifying and pitiful events, a profound error” (1991, 32), designates the 
key problem to be resolved or given meaning in the course of a tragic narrative plot.  
Peripeteia is essential in any story. Even if those who do not know Aristotle’s technical term 
will recognise its indispensable function in a story. Jerome Bruner demonstrates this when 
he asks “what, then, is a story?”  
Everyone will agree that it requires a cast of characters who are free agents with 
minds of their own. Given a moment to think about it, they’ll also agree that these 
characters have recognizable expectations about the ordinary state of the world, the 
story’s world, though these expectations may be somewhat enigmatic. And again, 
with a moment’s thought, everybody agrees that a story begins with some breach in 
the expected state of things—Aristotle’s peripeteia. Something goes awry, otherwise 
there’s nothing to tell about. The story concerns efforts to cope or come to terms with 
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the breach and its consequences. And finally there is an outcome, some sort of 
resolution (Bruner 2002, 16-17).   
The coherence of any narrative depends on the relationship of the events narrated to the 
conclusion of the story, and how it resolves or gives meaning to the peripeteia. Only from 
the perspective furnished by the end of the story do the beginning and middle of a narrative 
make sense (Kermode 2000).  It is for this reason that the experience of a second hearing or 
second reading of a narrative will always be different than our first encounter with it. This is 
most obvious when we think, for example, of a murder mystery. On re-reading the story we 
already know how it ends; all of the clues will seem obvious even if we could not see them 
beforehand. Neither the ending nor the story will anymore be a mystery.  
The moment of recognition, or anagnorisis in Aristotle’s terms, is one of the key 
moments of a narrative; it is the confluence point where the awareness of the narrator, the 
characters in the story, and the audience meet. While it is not as essential as peripeteia, it is 
a commonly occurring feature in certain narrative forms, and we will be familiar with its role 
in stories of religious change.  William Dowling explains:  
Ricoeur has from the beginning described emplotment as a telos or movement 
towards a destined or predetermined end. As one looks back on a completed series of 
events in a plot, it does look something like unity or simultaneity in the causal chain. 
Within the horizon of the story, the moment that the plot reveals itself as telos is what 
Aristotle called anagorisis, or recognition—in Oedipus Rex, that moment of terrible 
clarity when everyone sees that this outcome, though wholly unforeseeable from any 
previous perspective, was inevitable all along… it was entirely unforeseeable; yes, we 
now see that it was inevitable after all (2011, 9).  
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The anagnorisis is the narrative equivalent of the punch-line in a joke; it is the moment that 
makes the build-up of everything that has come before suddenly meaningful, in religious 
language it is an “epiphany” or a “revelation”. 
Narrative transforms lived experience of an event as it is refigured as an element in a 
narrative.  We do not live life as characters whose lives are emplotted in a story; we live 
facing forward into a future as yet unknown.  In telling a story retrospectively, even one 
drawn from our own life, we can only do so from the perspective of one who knows the 
ending of the story, looks back, and orders the events with that ending in view (Kermode 
2000). In a story, the beginning and middle can only be told so that they lead to an already 
given conclusion. Multiple hearings of the same story will, of course, shift our perspective. 
On first hearing a narrative, an audience will have a perspective that is closer to, though 
clearly not identical with, the perspective of lived experience, unable to see the ending. On 
a subsequent hearing, the audience joins the narrator’s perspective, and hears each 
element in light of the end of the story. 
I can only tell the story of who I am from the point at which I tell the story, not 
knowing how life will subsequently unfold.  I nevertheless need to tell the story in such a 
way that the conclusion, itself only a rest-stop at the moment of telling, makes sense.  So, 
events, experiences, thoughts and actions from the past need to be made consonant with 
the outcome at the point at which I have arrived (Ricoeur 1992). A different point in time, 
and a change in my self-conception means that I will inevitably tell a different story about 
how I have arrived where I am. Thus, to anticipate the argument presented below, a 
convert’s story will be different than the one that will be told by someone who has 
subsequently left the faith to which they had previously converted. That does not mean that 
apostates’ stories are any more, nor any less true than those of current adherents, but the 
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end point, and the perspective from which they are told has inevitably shifted, and the 
narrative along with it (Johnson 1998). This does not mean that there is no experience that 
can be subsequently related, but the way we tell stories necessarily shapes and conveys 
those experiences for ourselves and for others.  
While Ricoeur does not think that life-lived is reducible to life-narrated, neither does 
he think that they can be separated; each can only exist in a reciprocal or dialectical 
relationship with the other.  Human life and action is inescapably symbolic.  Our actions and 
life experiences are shaped by the stories we have absorbed from a young age—children 
learning a great deal of what they know of the world from hearing and subsequently telling 
stories.  At the same time, narrative is assembled from the raw material of life; this is as true 
of fiction as it is of historical, sociological, or autobiographical narratives. For Ricoeur, then, 
narrative is mimetic. This does not simply mean that art “imitates” life; rather, the 
configuring of life into narrative is both active and creative, shaping the stuff of life into 
story. We can only understand stories because of this relationship between life and story. As 
Ricoeur puts it, “our familiarity with the conceptual network of human acting is of the same 
order as the familiarity we have with the plots of stories that are known to us” (1991, 28).   
 Ricoeur contends that the basic framework of the narrative as we have outlined it, is 
universal, but particular narratives are socially patterned, and those patterns or genres 
change over time, and differ by social group (though he leaves this facet under-developed). 
We can only understand the growth and change of narrative traditions, as the interaction 
between the creative acts of emplotment and the sediment of previously emplotted 
narratives. In contrast to those who see tradition as that which does not change, Ricoeur 
argues that tradition can only live if it is dynamic. A tradition develops out of its own past as 
it responds to new contexts and takes up new directions. Thus, for example, the genre of 
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the novel -- which continues to bear the traces of the fact it was once a new (‘novel’) genre 
in its very name—was born of the creative emplotment of imagined events refigured in a 
particular way. This way of organising fictional events sediments over time into an 
established genre. Henceforth, all developments in the history of the novel consist of 
creative adaptations or responses to the genre’s past (Ricoeur 1985). The same can, of 
course, be said of conversion narratives, many of the guiding principles of the genre 
developed within eighteenth and nineteenth century Protestant Evangelicalism (Hindmarsh 
2005). 
 
NARRATIVES OF CONVERSION: A PROBLEM AND AN OPPORTUNITY 
Lofland and Stark’s (1965) “Becoming a world saver” marked the beginning of a 
renewed interest in, and a more sophisticated sociological understanding of, religious 
conversion. James Richardson (1979) has rightly argued that it inaugurated a new paradigm 
in the study of conversion. It is still the most cited and influential sociological theory of 
conversion, even if those who have taken up the argument do so with modification (Rambo 
1993). Even if Lofland and Stark do not have the last word on conversion, their article is a 
classic that functions as prototype for sociological thinking about conversion, and as such is 
a useful argument to consider in relation to Ricoeur’s theory of narratives.   
Lofland and Stark’s article deals with conversion to a ‘deviant perspective,’ a new 
religious movement referred to in the article as the Divine Principles, or DP (a pseudonym 
they gave to The Unification Church).  While Lofland and Stark’s conversion theory is based 
on a study of converts to the DP, they view the theory as applicable to all conversions to 
deviant perspectives; they also express doubt about whether the theory should be extended 
to those who adopt a ‘widely held’ perspective (1965, 862). Lofland and Stark’s conversion 
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process plots the journey of converts from (1) pre-conversion conditioning factors 
(experience of tension and a tendency towards religious solutions); (2) through seekership; 
(3) to a “turning point”; this is followed by (4) the development of affective bonds with 
members of the group, (5)which need to be stronger than those bonds outwith the group 
(especially the convert’s family of origin); and finally (6) to the intensive interaction that 
solidifies and maintains membership in the religious group.   
In this section, we superimpose Lofland and Stark’s process of conversion to a deviant 
perspective over Ricoeur’s account of narrative as outlined above. When seen in this way, it 
illuminates how Lofland and Stark’s process parallels the necessary structure of any 
narrative. This throws into question the extent to which Lofland and Stark may have 
mistaken the logic of emplotment for stages in the process of conversion.   
Lofland and Stark’s theory begins, as Ricoeur argues all narratives must, with the set-
up of a problem or situation for which the protagonist (the “pre-convert”) will seek 
resolution and or improvement. They explain that  
[p]erhaps the strongest qualitative generalization supported by the data is that pre-
converts felt themselves frustrated in their rather diverse aspirations. Most people 
probably have some type of frustrated aspiration, but pre-converts experienced the 
tension rather more acutely and over longer periods than most people do (Lofland and 
Stark 1965, 867).  
The acute tension experienced by the pre-convert is a necessary element of the narrative 
they tell; there is good reason to doubt if it reflects the lived experience at the time (Heirich 
1977). Converts’ stories of how they arrived at the point they have must begin with a 
problem to solve: there can be no narrative without peripeteia; the ending (as converts) 
requires a problem that conversion addresses.  There is nothing to suggest that Lofland and 
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Stark superimposed the peripeteia on the stories that they were told. Indeed, it seems more 
than likely that the converts themselves told their story accordingly, narrating an experience 
of tension pre-conversion. Nevertheless, there is no way to know if the converts 
experienced tensions more acute or of longer duration than that which all flesh is heir to, or 
if this is a consequence of the logic of emplotment. Whether they did or not experience 
greater tension, the end of the story requires a beginning, for the teller of the tale, just as it 
does for the sociological analyst of the tale. The people whose stories are recounted are the 
converts (the end of the story), so they need to have a problem that sets their journey 
towards conversion in motion; something must provide the set-up for the story that follows.  
The next step in Lofland and Stark’s theory is largely explained in terms of the 
character of the protagonists: in their search for a solution to their troubled lives, pre-
converts are inclined to seek religious, rather than, say, psychiatric or political solutions. 
Those who will end the story as religious converts must first become religious seekers, 
rather than political activists, or seekers of psychiatric services. Those who convert have 
sought to find “some satisfactory system of religious meaning to interpret and resolve his 
discontent, and each had taken some action to achieve this end” (1965, 868). Again, the 
proto-religiosity of the protagonist highlights those elements that foreshadow that ending 
to the story, which the constructor of a religious tale will select and highlight, just as the 
autobiography of a political activist will select and highlight proto-political impulses in the 
backstory. For Ricoeur, this is simply how we make sense of our own lives, and attempt to 
maintain the sense of continuity of self.  
In the unlikely scenario that the narrator of a conversion autobiography does not offer 
proto-religiosity in the back-story, a listener would inevitably find the story lacking plausible 
character development.  Without it, an interviewer or other interlocutor faced with such a 
13 
 
gap would find the explanation of how the narrator became a follower of DP as yet 
unaccounted for and seek it out.  Assuming some flexibility in the interview schedule, they 
would likely probe for the proto-religiosity at an earlier stage in light of which the ending 
makes sense.  
Finally, the story reaches a crisis, or turning point, accompanied by the recognition 
(anagnorisis) that points towards the resolution of the narrative. Hence, before their 
conversion to the Divine Precepts  
all pre-converts had reached or were about to reach what they perceived as a "turning 
point" in their lives… each had come to a moment when old lines of action were 
complete, had failed or been disrupted, or were about to be so, and when they faced 
the opportunity (or necessity), and possibly the burden, of doing something different 
with their lives (870).  
Thenceforth the outcome of a successful and lasting conversion depends on the convert 
developing affective relationships with members, on not being successfully opposed by non-
members (in particular, family and friends) who might oppose their involvement in the 
group, and is solidified by intensive interaction with members.  Whether the final step is a 
part of the process of conversion or its consequence has been a matter of subsequent 
debate, though research has largely confirmed that most converts have a relationship with 
someone in the group with whom they hear the group’s message before they are converted 
to it (Heirich 1977; Smilde 2005).  
There is little reason to doubt that Lofland and Stark’s theory is faithful to the 
accounts provided by followers of DP. The fact that Lofland and Stark do not seem to take 
into consideration that what they have been provided are “accounts” is more problematic 
(Snow and Machalek 1984). Although the sociological conceptualisation of “accounts” had 
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yet to be named—Scott and Lyman’s article was published three years later (1968)—the 
problem had been widely recognised for some time (Mills 1940).  Scott and Lyman describe 
an account as:  
a linguistic device employed whenever an action is subjected to valuative inquiry.  
Such devices are a crucial element in the social order since they prevent conflicts from 
arising by verbally bridging the gap between action and expectation. Moreover, 
accounts are "situated" according to the statuses of the interactants, and are 
standardized within cultures so that certain accounts are terminologically stabilized 
and routinely expected when activity falls outside the domain of expectations (1968, 
46). 
Certainly conversion to a “deviant” religious group is an action that is likely to be both 
surprising and subject to evaluation; as a consequence, a rationalising narrative is expected 
of the convert.   
There is an even more fundamental question, however. Have the respondents 
refigured their lived experience into a narrative format that produces the effect of the 
stages of a successful conversion in Lofland and Stark’s theory? In other words, is the theory 
a mirror of the process of conversion or of the necessary structure of a narrative? The 
consolidation of the conversion story, as summarised by Lofland and Stark, begins with the 
peripeteia of troubled lives and the frustrated aspirations of the pre-converts, and this 
inaugurates the “journey” or “search”, which experiences several setbacks and frustrations, 
before arriving at a solution to these troubles.  Long ago Heirich has provided evidence that 
strongly suggests that the troubles, or the sinfulness, of the pre-convert, is exaggerated post 
hoc (1977) to show the effectiveness of the religious conversion itself: there is typically no 
control group that would allow us to identify whether the pre-converts are more troubled 
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than their non-converting peers.  Looked at in narrative terms, however, there is no need to 
see this as exaggeration –let alone fabrication—but simply as selecting, highlighting and 
configuring events that necessarily must lead to the conclusion of the story that is being 
told, where the protagonist is a follower of the DP.  Few people never experience any 
tensions, frustrations, failings or crises that could not—retrospectively—be called upon as a 
justification for a decision to convert to a deviant perspective.  These selected events would 
be completely out of place if the narrator were telling a professional history to pitch why 
they were the ideal candidate for an advertised post, or of the history of a relationship that 
justify their reasons for petitioning for divorce. Each of these stories could be told by the 
same person having lived the same life, but they would highlight distinct sets of events and 
causal sequences that lead to a different end point.   Here, the analytic difficulty overlaps 
with—even if it is not identical to—a problem more familiar to sociologists: converts have 
been sampled on the dependent variable. Seldom do studies of conversion compare 
converts to non-converts, or even converts to different communities of discourse, though 
this is becoming more common (Jindra 2011). 
The account of peripeteia and the challenges to overcome them, comes to a head in a 
“turning point”, a moment of anagnorisis, which shows the way to the conclusion; this 
identity, as a follower of the Divine Precepts, seems to have been inevitable after all. The 
conclusion of the story shows retroactively how the member of the deviant religious group 
arrived where they did: it creates the troubled beginning (the peripeteia) and shows the 
configuration of events that follow to the conclusion as a causal sequence. That conclusion 
corresponds to the social location of the narrator at the time they tell the story, as followers 
of the Divine Precepts.  Insofar as respondents are telling a “religious” narrative about their 
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lives, the events in the story need to be told in such a way as to lead to this, and no other, 
end, which gives significance to all that comes before it  
 
WHAT PURPOSES DO CONVERSION STORIES SERVE?  
As we have shown, a conversion narrative is not simply a string onto which causal 
variables are threaded in sequence. Rather, the narrative structure stages and selects facts, 
shapes events and experiences, thrusting some into the spotlight, and leaving others in the 
shadows or waiting in the wings. Institutions and communities have expectations and 
assumptions about what kind events, characters, moods and actions are relevant and 
appropriate to the salient stories of those who belong to, or interact with them (Bruner 
2002). Many groups maintain norms about how certain kinds of stories are to be told; 
members are often guided by explicit or implicit templates and schemas that correspond to 
accepted cultural rules and institutional prerogatives, and these convey a worldview. What 
is as true of secular institutions like the courts (Bruner 2002), or of communities of 
discourse, like academic social science (Czarniawska 2004; McKinnon 2006) is no less true of 
religious groups and the stories that they tell themselves, each other, and the world.  
Stories are not just representations constructed according to a particular logic of 
assemblage, to narrate is also to act upon the self, upon the community to which one 
belongs, and on the world beyond the community of belonging. Conversion narratives are 
stories told with three primary purposes. First, the narrator of a conversion story, by telling 
stories in the manner of their adopted tribe demonstrates that the teller is a competent 
member (Beckford 1978).  Second, by narrating their own conversion, the narrator enacts 
the identity of the convert; the recounting does not just describe a process that has already 
happened, it is a means of enacting the convert’s narrative identity (Stromberg 1993). 
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Finally, conversion stories are told as invitations to potential recruits and other outsiders; 
they constitute a defence of the narrator’s conversion and an invitation to recreate the 
story for themselves, to share the same experience and benefit of conversion as described 
by someone who promotes it from the perspective of first-hand experience. These purposes 
refine the tales told by converts, often sedimenting into tradition-specific genres of 
conversion narration.   
Lofland and Stark do not claim that their theory applies to conversion to ‘widely held’ 
perspectives (1965, 862), though they do assume that their stages of conversion would 
apply neatly to stories of conversion to other deviant perspectives. Subsequent research has 
shown that conversion narratives to “deviant perspectives,” just as to “widely held” 
perspectives, are in fact both a good bit more varied. For example, as Beckford (1978), 
shows, Jehovah’s Witnesses tell stories that make the Watchtower Society the protagonist 
of the conversion story, reflecting Witnesses’ theology and ecclesiology. Likewise, compared 
with Lofland and Stark’s converts to DP, they take most of the drama out of the anagnorisis, 
employing rubrics of slow, measured recognition of the truth as it is portrayed by the 
Watchtower Society, rather than flashes of inspiration and sudden change.  
Considering a range of mostly “widely-held” perspectives, Nancy Ammerman observes 
that each religious tradition has their own set of stories, and adopting a religious identity is 
in part a matter of learning to participate in those stories (2003). Different religious 
communities tell distinctive variants of the conversion story. This is being increasingly 
recognised as a broader set of case-studies are considered; some of these studies even 
allow for direct comparison between the narratives of different traditions. Thus far, 
however, comparative narrative research has tended to make realist assumptions, treating 
the differences between conversion narratives as differences in the process of conversion to 
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different groups (Smilde 2003, 2005; Jindra 2011; Rambo and Farhadian 2014; Jindra 2011; 
Paloutzian 2014, Ammerman 2014). More comparative research on the narrative 
construction of different faith group identities, the boundaries they maintain between 
themselves and the world, and the process of crossing that boundary, is needed. Until we 
have a clearer view of those discursive practices, such realism risks failing to distinguish the 
the processes of conversion from the narratives that relay them.    
For some religious traditions, personal conversion narratives are the sine qua non of 
religious identity construction, Protestant Evangelicalism being the most obvious example 
(Kling 2004; Hindmarsh 2005).  It seems likely that evangelical conversion stories have 
functioned as the implicit prototype of conversion (both within the field of religion, and 
within the field of scholarship), but in fact variation is found there as well.  Recent research 
has shown that those adopting “born again” identities in Venezuala (Smilde 2003) and 
Malawi (Manglos 2010) have tended to cast conversion above all in moral terms. Morality 
has certainly not been absent from the genre of evangelical conversion story as it developed 
in the 18th and 19th century English speaking world (Hindmarsh 2005); however, like 
Beckford’s Witnesses (1978), these stories have emphasised the convert’s newfound belief. 
By contrast, in these two different Global South contexts, conversion where some form of 
Christian belief is itself widely held, being “born again” is understood as conformity to a 
particular (and often rigid) understanding of godly living. The convert mends their ways, but 
they are assumed to have already taken the propositional content of the faith for granted.  
The definition of the term “conversion” is a matter of some disagreement in the 
literature (Rambo and Farhadian 2014); it is also not universally accepted among the world’s 
religious traditions. Muslims, for example, are more inclined to talk about reversion to 
Islam. Given that Muslims do not share the Christian’s belief in original sin, submitting to 
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God is a return to the state in which the convert was born (Van Nieuwkerk 2014).  In this, 
there is a surprising parallel with the neo-pagans studied by Erin Johnston, who describe 
their newfound adherence to neo-paganism as a realisation that “I was always this way…” 
(2013), despite the fact that most had previously been active participants in other religious 
traditions. In both cases, the change may be radical and decisive while return or continuity 
provide the dominant theme. Viewed from a sociological, rather than a theological 
perspective, these claims cannot be taken literally, but they do say something important 
about how the believers conceive of their adoption of a new religious identity. 
Conversion stories are often told in formal and informal rituals of belonging within the 
community itself.  By the time a sociologist comes to hear the respondent’s conversion 
experience, the interviewee has already learned the genre.  We often have the sense when 
the story we hear has been well rehearsed. Extraneous details have been carved away and 
its edges have been worn smooth, and convenient details stick out.  Such repeated stories 
are usefully thought of as ritualised stories (McKinnon 2018).  This is particularly the case in 
religious traditions where telling one’s “testimony” is a regular feature of worship (where it 
will be addressed to insiders) and/or evangelistic services, where it is more likely addressed 
to outsiders, irrespective of whether any are present (Harding 2000; Kling 2014).  
Consistent with Ricoeur’s explication of narrative identity (1992), Peter Stromberg 
(1993) has argued that conversion narratives do not describe the self, but rather constitute 
it. That is, conversion narratives do not simply describe the journey to the present self, but 
also act upon the present self: the teller of a conversion narrative constructs and maintains 
a change of self-understanding, both in terms of their state of salvation, and that from 
which they have been saved (peripeteia), as well as the nature of the epiphany (anagnorisis) 
that brings one into agreement with the community of the saved.  
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None of this should be taken as the denial of a prior experience that is subsequently 
narrated.  Life-lived, even if it is always already symbolic, precedes its subsequent narration 
(Ricoeur 1992). However, the experience as recounted—to the self, to the community of 
belonging, or to the outsider—has already been assigned meaning as it is emplotted. 
Experiences take on new significance when placed in relation to other events and characters 
within a narrative structure where they become caused by preceding events and causes of 
those that follow.  The narrative frameworks of the community provide the relevant 
terminology, identifying an event as a conversion per se.   
Stories may be meant to inform, to instruct or to entertain; they are, however always 
also meant to persuade, even if only to persuade the hearer of their own coherence and 
plausibility.  Often, though, the story is told to persuade the hearer of something more—it 
forms an argument for the truth or efficacy of a view of the world. Even more than an 
argument, it is an invitation from the hearer to the same conversion, to enter the same 
story, and thereby share the same experience. The conversion story told to an outsider 
attempts to re-describe not only the teller’s, but implicitly also the hearer’s, current 
experience in the terms the teller’s past state, from which they, too, need to be, and can be, 
saved.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Lofland and Stark’s theory has functioned a one of the key prototypes for the sociological 
theory of conversion. Looked at in the light cast by Ricoeur’s work on narrative, we can see 
that the authors have conflated their description of the process of conversion with the 
structure of narratives by means of which converts tell of their experiences. Subsequent 
research on conversion has provided a broader empirical base from which we can begin to 
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grasp the diversity of conversion narratives. These have generally been framed in realist 
terms, providing insight into the mechanisms and processes of conversion, even when they 
are self-consciously styled as narrative inquiries. Following on insights from Ricoeur, I have 
suggested the need for further, comparative work on the sociology of religious narratives, 
and the way that these are shaped by the purposes for which conversion stories are told.  
Such works holds the promise of a firmer foundation for understanding the processes 
themselves while taking fuller account of the cultural and institutional organisation of 
communities to which people convert.  
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